Tuesday, 1 April 2008

The Beatitudes and Fruits of Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange

Dear Friends

I have some questions about the work of Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange rather than St. Thomas himself. I hope that this is an acceptable topic for discussion.

In the course of my research I have become increasingly convinced that the virtues, Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits form an organic whole in the ST 2a2ae. The patterns and interconnections are complex, fascinating and often somewhat counter-intuitive. To take one small example, courage as an infused virtue is linked to courage as a Gift. Courage as a Gift is linked to the Beatitudes of meekness and ‘hungering and thirsting for righteousness’. The beatitude of meekness in turn leads to the Fruits of patience and long-suffering. I am beginning. I believe, to understand some of underlying principles of these interconnections. This study will form the basis of my doctoral dissertation.

When I read Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, however, I do not see any awareness of the existence of these patterns in his summaries of Aquinas's work. He does, of course, claim that the infused and acquired virtues are different, because that is what Aquinas says. But even here, however, his definitions do not in practice establish grounds for supporting the assertion of a distinction. In his "Reality - A Synthesis Of Thomistic Thought", for example, Garrigou-Lagrange writes that “Justice, either acquired or infused, is a virtue residing in man's will, a virtue which destroys selfishness, and enables him to give to each neighbor that neighbor's due.” [51.2] The phrase ‘either acquired or infused’ in this definition conflates the acquired and infused modes of justice and fails to establish any obvious principle of distinction. Nevertheless, such a principle of distinction must exist given that the former without the latter leads to hell, not heaven.

Garrigou-Lagrange adopts the same approach for the remaining cardinal virtues. For the acquired and infused modes of each virtue, he proposes the same, essentially Aristotelian definition. The only principle of distinction he suggests is one of degree rather than kind, and the scale by which such distinctions of degree are established is left undefined. In practice, therefore, Garrigou-Lagrange validates an essentially two-tier approach. The philosophical virtues continue to be treated in an Aristotelian manner, while the theological additions are treated separately.

Furthemore, by the theological additions, Garrigou-Lagrange refers almost exclusively to the Gifts (following the pattern, perhaps, of John of St. Thomas); he does not mention the Beatitudes or the Fruits. So Garrigou-Lagrange seems to treat the acquried and infused versions of the cardinal virtues as essentially the same, although different in terms of their source. The Gifts give some sort of boost to these virtues. The Beatitudes and Fruits do not seem to feature.

My reading of Garrigou-Lagrange is still somewhat limited, so my questions are:

(1) Does G-L have a theory of the Thomistic virtues which includes Beatitudes and Fruits?
(2) Does G-L distinguish acquired and infused virtues in any way except source and degree?
(3) What, actually, does G-L think that the Gifts give to the virtues?

I would find this helpful for my dissertation, as well as for understanding the history of the interpretation of St. Thomas in the twentieth century.

Yours in the Lord

Fr. Andrew Pinsent

3 comments:

fr. Thomas said...

Dear Father Andrew,
Much of what you're looking for can be found, e.g., in 'The Three Ages of the Interior Life', especially in Volume One, Chapter III, 'The Spiritual Organism'.

For example (and taking your questions in reverse order) he makes it very clear that the acquired and infused 'version' of a given virtue differ essentially, not just in degree or in relation to their cause. They have a different 'formal object'. He writes, for example, 'Acquired temperance keeps a just medium in the matter of food in order that we may live reasonably, that we may not injure our health or the exercise of our reason. Infused temperance, on the contrary, keeeps a superior happy mean in the use of food, in order that we may live in a Christian manner as children of God, en route to the wholly supernatural life of eternity. Infused temperance thus implies a more severe mortification than is implied by acquired temprerance; it requires, as St Paul says, that man chastise his body and bring it into subjection'.
Externally, the difference between these two virtues might appear to be only a matter of degree; but philosophically considered, they differ in kind, since they're aiming at two different kinds of mean - that appropriate for a human being and that appropriate for a Christian, respectively. In general, the acquired virtues are governed by reason alone, whereas the infused virtues are governed by reason as enlightened by faith.

In regard to question 2, G-L has a whole section on this in this same chapter. The summary answer is that whereas the virtues make us ready to act, the gifts make us ready to be acted upon; to be moved smoothly and promptly by a special inspiration of the Holy Spirit. So unlike the virtues, we can't use them whenever we choose; they only come into play when we receive a special inspiration. So G-L says , 'Even infused prudence hesitates, for example, about what answer to give to an indiscreet question so as to avoid a lie and keep a secret; while a special inspiration of the Holy Ghost will enable us to find the proper reply, as Christ told his disciples (Matt. 10:19)'.
So whereas the principle that directs the acquired virtues is reason and that directing the infused virtues is reason enlightened by faith, that which directs the gifts is the Holy Spirit himself without intermediary.

On the first question, G-L treats of the beatitudes in 'The Three Ages...', volume I chapter IX (and passim). The main principle, taken from St Thomas's commentary on Matt 5:3, is that 'the beatitudes are acts proceeding from the Holy Ghost or from the virtues perfected by the gifts'. So they are not a new set of habitus in addition to the virtues and gifts, but the acts that the virtues and gifts elicit.
I didn't find any reference to the fruits in the index of this work. In his commentary on the treatise on faith, G-L says that 'they grow out of the infused virtues and gifts combined', like the beatitudes. In fact, the beatitudes are said to be a sub-class (the highest one) of the fruits: 'all the beatitudes are fruits, but not all fruits are beatitudes. Some fall short of them in excellence (continency, for example).'

By the way, on the subject of 20th Century commentaries, I'd recommend Labourdette's commentaries on the secunda pars. He was a pupil of Garrigou, and one of the inspirations of the flourishing Toulouse-Fribourg school.

Triduana said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Triduana said...

fr Thomas beats me to it again, drat drat. Well, my remaining tuppence worth:

3 Ages is online

www.christianperfection.info

so you can use Google to search it for Fruit.

There appears to be a hint or two, e.g. (if meekness translates whatever the French for mansuetudo is)

"The inspirations of the gift of piety then come greatly to the aid of the virtue of religion, bestowing on the soul perseverance in prayer in spite of the greatest spiritual aridity.(10) The fruit of this deep piety is meekness, which corresponds, says St. Augustine, to the beatitude of the meek"