I have chosen Ia, 81, 3. The title of the article is “Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?” I have chosen it not for its own sake but because of a comparison St Thomas makes in replying to the second objection. St Thomas’s general point is that, though they have some power of resistance to the reason the irascible and concupiscible appetites do obey reason. They respond to the rational apprehensions of the soul and they can be overruled by the will. Nevertheless, there is room for recalcitrance on the part of these appetites room for "another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." This is in contrast to the limbs etc. which, unless there is some defect, obey the will immediately.
St Thomas uses a political comparison to illustrate this point.
"As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): 'We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power.' For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey."
We might suppose that a "a politic and royal" government is inferior to a "despotic" one especially as the conflicting laws in our members and our minds are obviously a misfortune and the resurrected body will possess the quality of subtlety by which the body will be altogether subject to the soul.
But St Thomas does not propose despotic government as the model of human governance. In IaIIae, 105, 1 he proposes a mixture of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy as the best form of government. "[T]he best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all."
As such St Thomas’s preference is for monarchy because the business of government involves the ordering of many things to a single end so it is best done by that which is by nature one. In De Regno St Thomas presents the mixture of aristocracy and democracy with monarchy as a matter of ‘tempering’ monarchy and of each element preventing the corruption of the other. In the Summa he says "this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring".
It is worth bearing in mind that the disorder of the irascible and concupiscible appetites is a result of the disorder of the intellect. For it is because the intellect is not subject to God that the body is not fully subject to the mind. It is because man is bodily that a single mortal sin does not suffice to damn him for all eternity. So the perishable body may weigh down the soul and defy the intellect but it also anchors the soul in this world and prevents its sins from dragging it immediately into the second death. Thus the tempering of the different elements of the state by each other resembles the saving (or at least damnation-postponing) tension between the sensible appetites and the powers of the soul.
Would it be taking things to far to equate the aristocratic element with the intellect and the monarchical with the will?
In Unam Sanctam Boniface VIII explains the distinction of the Church from the State and subordination of the latter to the former with reference to the axiom of Dionysius the Areopagite “it is a law of the divinity that the lowest things reach the highest place by intermediaries”. The Catechism of the Catholic Church §1884 makes a similar point,
"God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power. He entrusts to every creature the functions it is capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own nature. This mode of governance ought to be followed in social life. The way God acts in governing the world, which bears witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire the wisdom of those who govern human communities. They should behave as ministers of divine providence."
Even in beatitude the rule of the soul over the body is not despotic because the rule of God over the soul not despotic. Man possesses free will in heaven because his incapacity to sin results from the perfect apprehension of the uncreated good not from the coercion of the will.
It seems therefore that the form of government St Thomas proposes, though it is a safeguard against the corruption of government, is also the form of government most fitting to human nature as such.
In ST IaIIae, 95, 4 while defending Isidore’s division of the law St Thomas says of a 'lex' that is in Roman Law a legislative proposal sanctioned by the Senate and the Assembly of the Roman People that it is the best form of legislation. "Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these [other forms], and which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the 'Lords and Commons'".
"Est autem aliquod regimen ex istis com mixtum quod est optimum : et secundum hoc sumitur lex, 'quam majores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt.'"
St Thomas makes no mention of plebiscites in his discussion of government in IaIIae, 105, 1. Given the bicameral character of the Dominican Chapter composed of Priors and Definitors both elected by the ordinary members of the order but the former ruling and the latter elected only to represent the subject with powers lasting only for the length of the representative assembly of which he is a member.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the plebeian assent of which St Thomas speaks would take this representative form. This is the same form given to it by Simon de Montfort in 1265 when the elected representatives of the commons met for the first time. De Montfort knew St Dominic as a child and the immediately preceding Parliament, 'The First English Parliament' of 1258, was also held under de Montfort’s auspices and met in Blackfriars Oxford.
This concept of the 'Political and Royal Government' was central to the thought of the fifteenth century theorist of the English Constitution Sir John Fortescue who argued that the English constitution accurately reflects the teachings of St Thomas Aquinas and severely criticised the despotic tendencies of the French Monarchy and the civilian tradition in general.
St Thomas’s comments in the Summa and De Regno as well as the works of Fortescue suggest that, in fact, the English tradition also reflects the Roman tradition of the Monarchical Republic better than the Byzantine forms of Roman Law adopted on the continent.
4 comments:
I should agree that it is not simply a consequence of the Fall that the mixed regime is best in practice for humsn societies. Bellarmine says that it is 'gratior et utilior' than pure monarchy. 'Gratior' because everyone prefers a regime where they participate in some way; 'utilior' because obviously the king in any society will need help, and the help will be more efficacious when he has true princes under him than mere delegates, since the former will govern their cities, or whatever it is they do, 'diligentius'.
Yet for all that he says that pure monarchy is still better simply speaking, for which he has a very simple argument: 'Simple monarchy is found in the government of God and of Christ; and whatever is best must be attributed to God and to Christ.' He adds that to say aristocracy is best simpliciter is logically to be a polytheist.
But how do the intellect and will correspond to aristocracy and monarchy?
I’m not sure that God rules the universe as a pure monarchy. St Thomas says Ia,22,3 "He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures." And of course intellectual creatures share in God's causation in an even more exalted way through prayer and the more saintly the more exalted. Thus, Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy operate in the universe by the Grace of God.
When I said I thought Aristocracy and Monarchy relate to each other as intellect to will I was thinking in the context of Parliament. Best illustrated by the summary of St Thomas’s doctrine in the intellect and will in the 21st Thesis "The will does not precede the intellect but follows upon it. The will necessarily desires that which is presented to it as a good in every respect satisfying the appetite. But it freely chooses among the many goods that are presented to it as desirable according to a changeable judgment or evaluation. Consequently, the choice follows the final practical judgment. But the will is the cause of it being the final one."
To be even more daring one might compare the national territory to the body (or the matter which is the principle of individuation), the populace to the senses, the Commons to the interior senses, the irascible and concupiscible appetites, the Lords to the intellect, and the Crown to the will. Obviously, this comparison does not hold for God’s government of the universe.
The analogy certainly gives food for thought. Is there a place for the Speaker?
Perhaps the Law and Constitution would be the agent intellect, casting a continual steady light over the activity of the two houses?
In 1a 103,3, St Thomas says that the universe is governed 'ab uno'; he doesn't there bring in the idea of a mixed regime as absolutely best. Obviously God rules by secondary causes; but I suppose the point about an aristocracy as opposed to a pure monarchy with delegates, is that the aristocrats contribute something good of their own as first causes, either limiting the power of the king, or bringing something to his attention that he doesn't know, or making important decisions on their own intitiative.
In contra Gentiles IV,76 he uses the notion of monarchy as the best regime to explain why there must be a pope. I don't know whether he applies the notion of the mixed regime to the Church; it certainly fits, though, and Bellarmine uses it expressly.
The tempering of the power of corruptible men is a function of mixed government only because of sin. The information and counsel provided by parliaments is a consequence of man's finitude. What I'm suggesting is that mixed government has a third pedagogical function and that is shows forth the greatness of the monarch that he seeks to rule over free men rather than slaves. Even if the monarch were perfect and omniscient there would be value in bringing his subjects to participate in their government, to give them the dignity of governing themselves. In the case of God this is the only sense in which His government is mixed but it goes to the root of creation itself. He does truly seek the participation of creatures in their own government to the point of bringing their intellects and wills to absolute perfection in the vision of the divine essence and men do truly represent the entire material creation before God. Obviously, the government of the universe is monarchical in essence. But human freedom and divine freedom do not conflict because God is the cause of our free acts.
St Thomas says in IIIa,30,1
It was reasonable that it should be announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ. First, in order to maintain a becoming order in the union of the Son of God with the Virgin--namely, that she should be informed in mind concerning Him, before conceiving Him in the flesh. Thus Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. iii): "Mary is more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ, than in conceiving the flesh of Christ"; and further on he adds: "Her nearness as a Mother would have been of no profit to Mary, had she not borne Christ in her heart after a more blessed manner than in her flesh."
Secondly, that she might be a more certain witness of this mystery, being instructed therein by God.
Thirdly, that she might offer to God the free gift of her obedience: which she proved herself right ready to do, saying: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord."
Fourthly, in order to show that there is a certain spiritual wedlock between the Son of God and human nature. Wherefore in the Annunciation the Virgin's consent was besought in lieu of that of the entire human nature.
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