This post is not an augur of things to come, for I am no philosopher or theologian. It may, however, serve to reduce the fear of asking stupid questions in public.
In St Thomas's Summa Theologiae, he treats of angels particularly in the Prima Pars qq.50-64. In I.50 he writes 'on the substance of angels considered absolutely', under the articles
In St Thomas's Summa Theologiae, he treats of angels particularly in the Prima Pars qq.50-64. In I.50 he writes 'on the substance of angels considered absolutely', under the articles
- Is there any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?
- Supposing that an angel is such, is it composed of matter and form?
- How many are there?
- Their difference from each other
- Their immortality or incorruptibility
(The links are to the English Dominican translation online at New Advent. Q.50 in Latin is at the top of this page at the Corpus Thomisticum website.)
This may or may not be relevant to any other reader, but as a non-philosopher non-theologian rustica illiterata medieval historian, I find that the angels have provided a good way in to certain distinctions which must be kept clear. Thomism may be the philosophy of common sense, but, as is now often remarked, common sense has become very uncommon, and it is difficult not to be infected by materialist assumption. To be confronted by the fact of the angels is to be confronted by the utter inadequacy of a vaguely materialist approach to being and knowing.
328 The existence of the spiritual, non-corporeal beings that Sacred Scripture usually calls "angels" is a truth of faith. the witness of Scripture is as clear as the unanimity of Tradition.
330 As purely spiritual creatures angels have intelligence and will: they are personal and immortal creatures, surpassing in perfection all visible creatures, as the splendour of their glory bears witness.
CCC
In I.50.1 Thomas argues for - well, a question, O wise comrades: I think he is arguing in the first instance for the possibility of the existence of 'wholly incorporeal' creatures, not (as such) for their actual existence - but essentially making a strong argument from fittingness for their actual existence - is that right?
(Incidentally this line of thought also makes clear that spirit is as such superior to matter, while also showing that spiritual creatures are still creatures and therefore infinitely inferior to their Maker. That is one of the distinctions angels help one to think about.)
This may or may not be relevant to any other reader, but as a non-philosopher non-theologian rustica illiterata medieval historian, I find that the angels have provided a good way in to certain distinctions which must be kept clear. Thomism may be the philosophy of common sense, but, as is now often remarked, common sense has become very uncommon, and it is difficult not to be infected by materialist assumption. To be confronted by the fact of the angels is to be confronted by the utter inadequacy of a vaguely materialist approach to being and knowing.
328 The existence of the spiritual, non-corporeal beings that Sacred Scripture usually calls "angels" is a truth of faith. the witness of Scripture is as clear as the unanimity of Tradition.
330 As purely spiritual creatures angels have intelligence and will: they are personal and immortal creatures, surpassing in perfection all visible creatures, as the splendour of their glory bears witness.
CCC
In I.50.1 Thomas argues for - well, a question, O wise comrades: I think he is arguing in the first instance for the possibility of the existence of 'wholly incorporeal' creatures, not (as such) for their actual existence - but essentially making a strong argument from fittingness for their actual existence - is that right?
Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere aliquas creaturas incorporeas. Id enim quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit est bonum quod consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Perfecta autem assimilatio effectus ad causam attenditur, quando effectus imitatur causam secundum illud per quod causa producit effectum; sicut calidum facit calidum. Deus autem creaturam producit per intellectum et voluntatem, ut supra ostensum est. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod sint aliquae creaturae intellectuales. Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicuius virtutis corporeae, quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc. Unde necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura.
(Incidentally this line of thought also makes clear that spirit is as such superior to matter, while also showing that spiritual creatures are still creatures and therefore infinitely inferior to their Maker. That is one of the distinctions angels help one to think about.)
Next in the same 'respondeo dicendum' Thomas refers to the implications of distinguishing between sense, imagination and intellect.
This is equally a modern error. In the current climate it is a particularly difficult one really to get away from, since thought without imagination is very difficult (impossible?), and so thinking about incorporeal things is very difficult. He talks further about how we know things in Art.2 ('whether an angel is composed of matter and form'), which suggests further, I think, the importance of attending to reason even (especially) when imagination cannot follow where the intellect would go.
The full answer also involves reflections on the movements of the heavenly bodies and suchlike, which I suspect is about sorting out how far one should have a [ps]-Dionysian view of being, but those parts are rather beyond me - would anyone care to comment?
Art. 4 ('whether angels differ in species') explains that angels must each be of a different species since
Which reminds that for us (and other material creatures) matter is the thing that individuates. But I don't follow the second half of the 'respondeo dicendum'... what does he mean by talking about matter while assuming the angels are incorporeal - help??! :
Finally, in Art. 5 ('whether angels are incorruptible?') Thomas explains that angels are of their nature incorruptible, since their form is not separate from their being (I hope that's not a terribly wrong way of putting it - ?), whereas material things have the possibility of the separation of matter and form, which means the end of its actual being (it ceases to be in act):
He also points out in the first objection and answer that this does not mean angels are not perfectly incorruptible, since their nature is still susceptible to change. Only by grace are the angels perfectly incorruptible. (And so we see again that spiritual creatures are very much not to be confused with their Creator.)
Right, tell me what howlers I've made...
Antiqui autem, ignorantes vim intelligendi, et non distinguentes inter sensum et intellectum, nihil esse existimaverunt in mundo, nisi quod sensu et imaginatione apprehendi potest. Et quia sub imaginatione non cadit nisi corpus, existimaverunt quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus; ut philosophus dicit in IV Physic. Et ex his processit Sadducaeorum error, dicentium non esse spiritum. Sed hoc ipsum quod intellectus est altior sensu, rationabiliter ostendit esse aliquas res incorporeas, a solo intellectu comprehensibiles.
This is equally a modern error. In the current climate it is a particularly difficult one really to get away from, since thought without imagination is very difficult (impossible?), and so thinking about incorporeal things is very difficult. He talks further about how we know things in Art.2 ('whether an angel is composed of matter and form'), which suggests further, I think, the importance of attending to reason even (especially) when imagination cannot follow where the intellect would go.
Sed adhuc ulterius impossibile est quod substantia intellectualis habeat qualemcumque materiam. Operatio enim cuiuslibet rei est secundum modum substantiae eius. Intelligere autem est operatio penitus immaterialis. Quod ex eius obiecto apparet, a quo actus quilibet recipit speciem et rationem, sic enim unumquodque intelligitur, inquantum a materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales formae, quas intellectus non apprehendit secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde relinquitur quod omnis substantia intellectualis est omnino immaterialis. Non est autem necessarium quod ea quae distinguuntur secundum intellectum, sint distincta in rebus, quia intellectus non apprehendit res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum. Unde res materiales, quae sunt infra intellectum nostrum, simpliciori modo sunt in intellectu nostro, quam sint in seipsis. Substantiae autem angelicae sunt supra intellectum nostrum. Unde intellectus noster non potest attingere ad apprehendendum eas secundum quod sunt in seipsis; sed per modum suum, secundum quod apprehendit res compositas. Et sic etiam apprehendit Deum, ut supra dictum est.
The answer to the question raised in Art. 3 ('whether the angels are in any great number') is (I think) not unintuitive - yes, there are lots of them. The first two objections and answers are also fairly straightforward, pointing out that number is not the be confused with quantity or non-simplicity:
[1] Videtur quod Angeli non sint in aliquo magno numero. Numerus enim species quantitatis est, et sequitur divisionem continui. Hoc autem non potest esse in Angelis cum sint incorporei, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo Angeli non possunt esse in aliquo magno numero. ... Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Angelis non est numerus qui est quantitas discreta, causatus ex divisione continui, sed causatus ex distinctione formarum, prout multitudo est de transcendentibus, ut supra dictum est.
[2] Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis propinquum uni, tanto minus est multiplicatum, ut in numeris apparet. Natura autem angelica inter alias naturas creatas est Deo propinquior. Cum ergo Deus sit maxime unus, videtur quod in natura angelica inveniatur minimum de multitudine. ... Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod natura angelica est Deo propinqua, oportet quod habeat minimum de multitudine in sui compositione, non autem ita quod in paucis salvetur.
The full answer also involves reflections on the movements of the heavenly bodies and suchlike, which I suspect is about sorting out how far one should have a [ps]-Dionysian view of being, but those parts are rather beyond me - would anyone care to comment?
Art. 4 ('whether angels differ in species') explains that angels must each be of a different species since
Ea enim quae conveniunt specie et differunt numero, conveniunt in forma, et distinguuntur materialiter. Si ergo Angeli non sunt compositi ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos Angelos unius speciei.
Which reminds that for us (and other material creatures) matter is the thing that individuates. But I don't follow the second half of the 'respondeo dicendum'... what does he mean by talking about matter while assuming the angels are incorporeal - help??! :
Sicut etiam impossibile esset dicere quod essent plures albedines separatae, aut plures humanitates; cum albedines non sint plures nisi secundum quod sunt in pluribus substantiis. Si tamen Angeli haberent materiam, nec sic possent esse plures Angeli unius speciei. Sic enim oporteret quod principium distinctionis unius ab alio esset materia, non quidem secundum divisionem quantitatis, cum sint incorporei, sed secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Quae quidem diversitas materiae causat diversitatem non solum speciei, sed generis.
Finally, in Art. 5 ('whether angels are incorruptible?') Thomas explains that angels are of their nature incorruptible, since their form is not separate from their being (I hope that's not a terribly wrong way of putting it - ?), whereas material things have the possibility of the separation of matter and form, which means the end of its actual being (it ceases to be in act):
Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere Angelos secundum suam naturam esse incorruptibiles. Cuius ratio est, quia nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc, quod forma eius a materia separatur, unde, cum Angelus sit ipsa forma subsistens, ut ex dictis patet, impossibile est quod eius substantia sit corruptibilis. Quod enim convenit alicui secundum se, nunquam ab eo separari potest, ab eo autem cui convenit per aliud, potest separari, separato eo secundum quod ei conveniebat. Rotunditas enim a circulo separari non potest, quia convenit ei secundum seipsum, sed aeneus circulus potest amittere rotunditatem per hoc, quod circularis figura separatur ab aere. Esse autem secundum se competit formae, unumquodque enim est ens actu secundum quod habet formam. Materia vero est ens actu per formam. Compositum igitur ex materia et forma desinit esse actu per hoc, quod forma separatur a materia. Sed si ipsa forma subsistat in suo esse, sicut est in Angelis, ut dictum est, non potest amittere esse. Ipsa igitur immaterialitas Angeli est ratio quare Angelus est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam. Et huius incorruptibilitatis signum accipi potest ex eius intellectuali operatione, quia enim unumquodque operatur secundum quod est actu, operatio rei indicat modum esse ipsius. Species autem et ratio operationis ex obiecto comprehenditur. Obiectum autem intelligibile, cum sit supra tempus, est sempiternum. Unde omnis substantia intellectualis est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam.
He also points out in the first objection and answer that this does not mean angels are not perfectly incorruptible, since their nature is still susceptible to change. Only by grace are the angels perfectly incorruptible. (And so we see again that spiritual creatures are very much not to be confused with their Creator.)
Videtur quod Angeli non sint incorruptibiles. Dicit enim Damascenus de Angelo, quod est substantia intellectualis, gratia et non natura immortalitatem suscipiens. ... Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus accipit immortalitatem perfectam, quae includit omnimodam immutabilitatem, quia omnis mutatio est quaedam mors, ut Augustinus dicit. Perfectam autem immutabilitatem Angeli non nisi per gratiam assequuntur, ut infra patebit.
Right, tell me what howlers I've made...
4 comments:
I think St Thomas's argument is that of all the creatures it is possible to create it is possible to identify which it is the most fitting to create. As the purpose of creation is that finite beings
should participate in the Divine goodness (and as we can prove from natural reason that it is possible for creatures to exist, such as our souls, that operate and can exist apart from matter) then a fortiori the most fitting creatures of all to create are spiritual creatures pure minds who are identical with their own forms (not their own being!) for they most closely imitate the metaphysical simplicity of God (who is identical with His own being). This seems to be the basis of the argument in article 3 that there are more angels than all actually existing material singulars as well. I’m not sure what this would imply about the number of human souls that will exist whether this too will eventfully equal the number of material singulars in existence at any one time?
When St Thomas says that angels subsist in their own being he means that they have no potency to cease to exist once they do exist. They are necessary beings but their necessity is derived from the creative act by which God gives existence to their essence and preserves them in being. Were he to cease to do this they would cease to exist. However, He would never have created immortal beings if He intended to annihilate them so we know this will not happen (I can’t remember where Thomas says this but he does).
“As was observed above (44, 1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.”
There is an analogy between the relationship between matter and form and that between essence and existence and it is in this sense only "Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as
what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them."
St Thomas considers the possibility of Angels possessing a material element because this was held by certain of his contemporaries. It seems to be a long dead opinion now.
‘in his quae sunt unius speciei, non est invenire prius et posterius’ is interesting. I wonder if this can be used politically or if I am taking it out of context. I can’t find the original line in Aristotle but I am in a rush so I haven’t looked carefully.
Art.1 Interestingly, he doesn't simply argue that angels are 'the best kind of thing' there can be and that therefore God must have created them. He says that they bear most resemblance to God considered precisely as an efficient cause; God is such a cause by intellect and will, and such a cause is most fully a cause when it causes other things that have intellect and will (reminiscent of Michelangelo striking the statue of David that he'd just sculpted and saying, 'Speak!')
This I suppose is a very strong argument 'ex convenientia' rather than a strictly apodeictic argument.
Then there is a further move from 'intellectual/incorporeal beings' to 'purely intellectual/incorporeal beings'. This again seems to be an argument of fittingness. Since the intellect is higher than the senses, one can infer 'rationabiliter'that there are objects for it to know higher than the objects of the senses, but subsistent like them.
Art. 2 This gives some help with the (to us) very puzzling reference later on to angels that might have some matter in them, despite being incorporeal. St Thomas explains that Avicebron saw that angels and bodily substances must have something in common, and so suggested that it was matter, i.e. some purely indeterminate potentiality to be made into something; that in the case of bodies, this 'matter' was made into a bodily thing, and for angels was made into an angel.
I think his mistake must have been to lack a sense of analogy. Angels and e.g. trees do have something in common, but not something univocal such as 'matter'. What they have in common is just that they are all beings, i.e. that they have an essence and an act of existence.
I seem to remember that St Bonaventure and perhaps St Albert were influenced by Avicebron and talked of angels as having 'spiritual matter', i.e. something potential in their essence that received a form. This is what St Thomas denies. Possibly the confusion was also caused by Aristotle talking somewhere about 'intelligble matter'; St Thomas explains in the De Ente et Essentia that this just means material things considered in abstraction from anything other than their quantity (i.e. ignoring their colours, texture, posture etc).
Art. 3
The point about the heavenly bodies doesn't seem particularly difficult; it's just Aristotle suggesting that the separated substances move the planets etc, and so maybe there is only one for each 'sphere' - which wouldn't be many, if all the stars are on one sphere.
Cajetan in his commentary says that the comparison is not to material singulars but to material species (with reference to De Potentia 7,5 corp.) So there need not be more angels than grains of sand. This seems reasonable; after all, if each angel is a species, it makes sense to compare their multitude to a multitude of material species.
I don't think it follows that there must be more souls than material species, any more than there must be more cherubim or more seraphim.
Art. 4 No comment.
Art 5. The phrase 'esse secundum se competit formae' is interesting. Cajetan explains it by contrasting this with the relation between form and matter. The matter pre-exists and is joined to a (new) form by the action of some agent. 'But in between any form and the existence of the thing there is no action that mediates, joining the one to the other; for it is not that there was first a form which would then be joined by some action to existence; but the complete coming-to-be of the form involves this conjunction (ipsum fieri formae ad illam coniunctionem terminatur.)'He says that when two 'things' are thus universally joined with no action joining them, they are inseparable.
The reference to God never annihilating anything is De Potentia 5,4.
Thanks for the post and the valuable comments.
These questions about the spirituality of angels do indeed help us to discern the truth about God's own nature and His proper distinction from us.
In reference to art. 2
In a metaphysical universe in which all being is univocal, 'matter' often becomes the only way of distinguishing between the infinite and the finite. In some forms of Platontic thought matter in seen as the 'stuff' that makes a being less than God. Matter is a wholly negative thing - the less of it the better!. In Gnostic views of the universe we find a concept of the 'fall' descibed in terms of increasing materialisation (and redemption in terms increasing spiritualisation).
The view that angels possess matter probably owes something to these ways of thinking.
St Thomas' metaphysics in general and his doctrine on angels in particular help us to see that the great point of distinction between Creator and Creature is not a distinction of Spirit and Matter. God's being is only analogous to that of anything else, it is simply and completely distinguished by the fact that His essence is to exist whilst all other beings needn't exist.
That we can have beings other than God who are completely and utterly spiritual blows apart the Platonic/Gnostic universe. Matter is not evil. Material beings can be perfect according to their own act-of-being. Men do not have to aspire to be angels. Angels can enjoy the same humility as men in being contingent creatures.
Many thanks for the helpful comments!
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