other blog?

see quaestiones quod.,

Shall we run two, or just put everything on the one? It might be livelier the second way! (fr Thomas, I will get back to the context in a bit)

Political and Royal Government

I have chosen Ia, 81, 3. The title of the article is “Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?” I have chosen it not for its own sake but because of a comparison St Thomas makes in replying to the second objection. St Thomas’s general point is that, though they have some power of resistance to the reason the irascible and concupiscible appetites do obey reason. They respond to the rational apprehensions of the soul and they can be overruled by the will. Nevertheless, there is room for recalcitrance on the part of these appetites room for "another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." This is in contrast to the limbs etc. which, unless there is some defect, obey the will immediately.

St Thomas uses a political comparison to illustrate this point.

"As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): 'We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power.' For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey."

We might suppose that a "a politic and royal" government is inferior to a "despotic" one especially as the conflicting laws in our members and our minds are obviously a misfortune and the resurrected body will possess the quality of subtlety by which the body will be altogether subject to the soul.

But St Thomas does not propose despotic government as the model of human governance. In IaIIae, 105, 1 he proposes a mixture of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy as the best form of government. "[T]he best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all."

As such St Thomas’s preference is for monarchy because the business of government involves the ordering of many things to a single end so it is best done by that which is by nature one. In De Regno St Thomas presents the mixture of aristocracy and democracy with monarchy as a matter of ‘tempering’ monarchy and of each element preventing the corruption of the other. In the Summa he says "this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring".

It is worth bearing in mind that the disorder of the irascible and concupiscible appetites is a result of the disorder of the intellect. For it is because the intellect is not subject to God that the body is not fully subject to the mind. It is because man is bodily that a single mortal sin does not suffice to damn him for all eternity. So the perishable body may weigh down the soul and defy the intellect but it also anchors the soul in this world and prevents its sins from dragging it immediately into the second death. Thus the tempering of the different elements of the state by each other resembles the saving (or at least damnation-postponing) tension between the sensible appetites and the powers of the soul.

Would it be taking things to far to equate the aristocratic element with the intellect and the monarchical with the will?

In Unam Sanctam Boniface VIII explains the distinction of the Church from the State and subordination of the latter to the former with reference to the axiom of Dionysius the Areopagite “it is a law of the divinity that the lowest things reach the highest place by intermediaries”. The Catechism of the Catholic Church §1884 makes a similar point,

"God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power. He entrusts to every creature the functions it is capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own nature. This mode of governance ought to be followed in social life. The way God acts in governing the world, which bears witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire the wisdom of those who govern human communities. They should behave as ministers of divine providence."

Even in beatitude the rule of the soul over the body is not despotic because the rule of God over the soul not despotic. Man possesses free will in heaven because his incapacity to sin results from the perfect apprehension of the uncreated good not from the coercion of the will.

It seems therefore that the form of government St Thomas proposes, though it is a safeguard against the corruption of government, is also the form of government most fitting to human nature as such.

In ST IaIIae, 95, 4 while defending Isidore’s division of the law St Thomas says of a 'lex' that is in Roman Law a legislative proposal sanctioned by the Senate and the Assembly of the Roman People that it is the best form of legislation. "Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these [other forms], and which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the 'Lords and Commons'".

"Est autem aliquod regimen ex istis com mixtum quod est optimum : et secundum hoc sumitur lex, 'quam majores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt.'"

St Thomas makes no mention of plebiscites in his discussion of government in IaIIae, 105, 1. Given the bicameral character of the Dominican Chapter composed of Priors and Definitors both elected by the ordinary members of the order but the former ruling and the latter elected only to represent the subject with powers lasting only for the length of the representative assembly of which he is a member.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the plebeian assent of which St Thomas speaks would take this representative form. This is the same form given to it by Simon de Montfort in 1265 when the elected representatives of the commons met for the first time. De Montfort knew St Dominic as a child and the immediately preceding Parliament, 'The First English Parliament' of 1258, was also held under de Montfort’s auspices and met in Blackfriars Oxford.

This concept of the 'Political and Royal Government' was central to the thought of the fifteenth century theorist of the English Constitution Sir John Fortescue who argued that the English constitution accurately reflects the teachings of St Thomas Aquinas and severely criticised the despotic tendencies of the French Monarchy and the civilian tradition in general.

St Thomas’s comments in the Summa and De Regno as well as the works of Fortescue suggest that, in fact, the English tradition also reflects the Roman tradition of the Monarchical Republic better than the Byzantine forms of Roman Law adopted on the continent.

Divine Simplicity and Human Knowledge

My quotation is from the Summa contra Gentes, Book III, chapter 118. The title of this chapter is ‘That by the divine law, men are obliged to have the correct faith’. I want to look at just one argument made in the chapter (by the way, the chapter presupposes that we are obliged to love God, which is discussed in c. 116). The Latin text is as follows:-

Quicumque errat circa aliquid quod est de essentia rei, non cognoscit illam rem: sicut si aliquis apprehenderet animal irrationale aestimans hoc esse hominem, non cognosceret hominem. Secus autem esset si erraret circa aliquod accidentium eius. Sed in compositis, qui errat circa aliquod principiorum essentialium, etsi non cognoscat rem simpliciter, tamen cognoscit eam secundum quid: sicut qui existimat hominem esse animal irrationale, cognoscit eum secundum genus suum.

In simplicibus autem hoc non potest accidere, sed quilibet error totaliter excludit cognitionem rei. Deus autem est maxime simplex. Ergo quicumque errat circa Deum, non cognoscit Deum: sicut qui credit Deum esse corpus, nullo modo cognoscit Deum, sed apprehendit aliquid aliud loco Dei. Secundum autem quod aliquid cognoscitur, secundum hoc amatur et desideratur. Qui ergo errat circa Deum, nec amare potest Deum, nec desiderare ipsum ut finem. Cum igitur lex divina ad hoc tendat ut homines ament et desiderent Deum, oportet quod ex lege divina homines obligentur ad rectam fidem habendam de Deo…

…Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium quod nihil refert ad salutem hominis cum quacumque fide serviat Deo.

Here is my translation:-

Whoever makes a mistake about something which is essential to a thing, does not know that thing. For example, if someone saw an irrational animal and thought ‘this is man’, he would not know what man is. It would be different if he made a mistake about something accidental to it. Now, when it is a question of a complex thing, someone who makes a mistake about one of its essential principles does not know that thing simply speaking; yet he knows it in a certain respect. For example, if someone thinks that man is an irrational animal, he knows man’s genus.

But this cannot happen with knowledge of simple things; for here, any kind of mistake completely prevents knowledge of the thing. Now, God is supremely simple. Therefore, whoever makes a mistake about God, does not know God. For example, if someone thinks that God is a body, he does not know God at all, but he has in mind something else, in place of God. But it is insofar as something is known that it is loved and desired. Therefore, whoever makes a mistake about God cannot love God, nor desire him as an end. Since, then, the divine law aims that men should love and desire God, the divine law must bind men to have a correct faith concerning God…

…In this way is excluded the error of some who said that it does not matter for man’s salvation in what faith he serves God.

We can note St Thomas’s realism. Knowing a thing means there is a real contact between the mind of the knower and the thing known. It is not just a matter of being able to make correct statements, e.g. ‘God created the universe’ or ‘God is great’.

If a thing belongs to a certain group within a wider category – in the technical phrase, if it is put into a certain species by genus and differentia -, we can at least know what general category it belongs to, even if we are wrong about the species. That is not a very thorough knowledge, but at least our mind is in some sense in contact with the thing. But if the essence is something utterly simple, we either ‘hit it’, mentally, or we miss it. If you are shooting at a target, you can get more or less close to the centre. But if we are shooting at a mathematical point, we can only hit or miss.

For example, if you tell me to think of white and I think of two, or to think of length and I think of thought, then I am not even partly right or right secundum quid. That is analogous to the difference between thinking of God and thinking of ‘a bodily creator of the universe’ or ‘an entirely necessary, but mutable being’, or anything else which combines divine attributes with errors. One would not then be thinking about God, while being wrong about him in some respect; one would be thinking about something else; a purely mythical being. For every divine attribute is God; so if I deny a divine attribute, I deny God.

This of course raises an interesting question about the other religions (ut aiunt), particularly perhaps Islam. For Islam is not simply unaware of the Trinity, or of the divine love – lack of explicit awareness of a divine attribute is compatible with knowing God – it denies these of set purpose. It puts before its adherents ‘a creator who is not love’ and ‘a creator whose nature is not such that it can be possessed by more than one Person’. As such, it is not that its doctrine of God is deficient, or partly true and partly false; it puts a purely mythical being before its adherents.

This is not to say that no Muslim can ever think of God, only that he cannot think of him qua Muslim. It may be that he has 2 concepts, both of which he signifies by the same term, ‘God’, one which enables him to know God in some respect, the other which refers to a purely mythical being.