This post is not an augur of things to come, for I am no philosopher or theologian. It may, however, serve to reduce the fear of asking stupid questions in public.
In St Thomas's Summa Theologiae, he treats of angels particularly in the Prima Pars qq.50-64. In I.50 he writes 'on the substance of angels considered absolutely', under the articles
In St Thomas's Summa Theologiae, he treats of angels particularly in the Prima Pars qq.50-64. In I.50 he writes 'on the substance of angels considered absolutely', under the articles
- Is there any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?
- Supposing that an angel is such, is it composed of matter and form?
- How many are there?
- Their difference from each other
- Their immortality or incorruptibility
(The links are to the English Dominican translation online at New Advent. Q.50 in Latin is at the top of this page at the Corpus Thomisticum website.)
This may or may not be relevant to any other reader, but as a non-philosopher non-theologian rustica illiterata medieval historian, I find that the angels have provided a good way in to certain distinctions which must be kept clear. Thomism may be the philosophy of common sense, but, as is now often remarked, common sense has become very uncommon, and it is difficult not to be infected by materialist assumption. To be confronted by the fact of the angels is to be confronted by the utter inadequacy of a vaguely materialist approach to being and knowing.
328 The existence of the spiritual, non-corporeal beings that Sacred Scripture usually calls "angels" is a truth of faith. the witness of Scripture is as clear as the unanimity of Tradition.
330 As purely spiritual creatures angels have intelligence and will: they are personal and immortal creatures, surpassing in perfection all visible creatures, as the splendour of their glory bears witness.
CCC
In I.50.1 Thomas argues for - well, a question, O wise comrades: I think he is arguing in the first instance for the possibility of the existence of 'wholly incorporeal' creatures, not (as such) for their actual existence - but essentially making a strong argument from fittingness for their actual existence - is that right?
(Incidentally this line of thought also makes clear that spirit is as such superior to matter, while also showing that spiritual creatures are still creatures and therefore infinitely inferior to their Maker. That is one of the distinctions angels help one to think about.)
This may or may not be relevant to any other reader, but as a non-philosopher non-theologian rustica illiterata medieval historian, I find that the angels have provided a good way in to certain distinctions which must be kept clear. Thomism may be the philosophy of common sense, but, as is now often remarked, common sense has become very uncommon, and it is difficult not to be infected by materialist assumption. To be confronted by the fact of the angels is to be confronted by the utter inadequacy of a vaguely materialist approach to being and knowing.
328 The existence of the spiritual, non-corporeal beings that Sacred Scripture usually calls "angels" is a truth of faith. the witness of Scripture is as clear as the unanimity of Tradition.
330 As purely spiritual creatures angels have intelligence and will: they are personal and immortal creatures, surpassing in perfection all visible creatures, as the splendour of their glory bears witness.
CCC
In I.50.1 Thomas argues for - well, a question, O wise comrades: I think he is arguing in the first instance for the possibility of the existence of 'wholly incorporeal' creatures, not (as such) for their actual existence - but essentially making a strong argument from fittingness for their actual existence - is that right?
Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere aliquas creaturas incorporeas. Id enim quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit est bonum quod consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Perfecta autem assimilatio effectus ad causam attenditur, quando effectus imitatur causam secundum illud per quod causa producit effectum; sicut calidum facit calidum. Deus autem creaturam producit per intellectum et voluntatem, ut supra ostensum est. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod sint aliquae creaturae intellectuales. Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicuius virtutis corporeae, quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc. Unde necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura.
(Incidentally this line of thought also makes clear that spirit is as such superior to matter, while also showing that spiritual creatures are still creatures and therefore infinitely inferior to their Maker. That is one of the distinctions angels help one to think about.)
Next in the same 'respondeo dicendum' Thomas refers to the implications of distinguishing between sense, imagination and intellect.
This is equally a modern error. In the current climate it is a particularly difficult one really to get away from, since thought without imagination is very difficult (impossible?), and so thinking about incorporeal things is very difficult. He talks further about how we know things in Art.2 ('whether an angel is composed of matter and form'), which suggests further, I think, the importance of attending to reason even (especially) when imagination cannot follow where the intellect would go.
The full answer also involves reflections on the movements of the heavenly bodies and suchlike, which I suspect is about sorting out how far one should have a [ps]-Dionysian view of being, but those parts are rather beyond me - would anyone care to comment?
Art. 4 ('whether angels differ in species') explains that angels must each be of a different species since
Which reminds that for us (and other material creatures) matter is the thing that individuates. But I don't follow the second half of the 'respondeo dicendum'... what does he mean by talking about matter while assuming the angels are incorporeal - help??! :
Finally, in Art. 5 ('whether angels are incorruptible?') Thomas explains that angels are of their nature incorruptible, since their form is not separate from their being (I hope that's not a terribly wrong way of putting it - ?), whereas material things have the possibility of the separation of matter and form, which means the end of its actual being (it ceases to be in act):
He also points out in the first objection and answer that this does not mean angels are not perfectly incorruptible, since their nature is still susceptible to change. Only by grace are the angels perfectly incorruptible. (And so we see again that spiritual creatures are very much not to be confused with their Creator.)
Right, tell me what howlers I've made...
Antiqui autem, ignorantes vim intelligendi, et non distinguentes inter sensum et intellectum, nihil esse existimaverunt in mundo, nisi quod sensu et imaginatione apprehendi potest. Et quia sub imaginatione non cadit nisi corpus, existimaverunt quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus; ut philosophus dicit in IV Physic. Et ex his processit Sadducaeorum error, dicentium non esse spiritum. Sed hoc ipsum quod intellectus est altior sensu, rationabiliter ostendit esse aliquas res incorporeas, a solo intellectu comprehensibiles.
This is equally a modern error. In the current climate it is a particularly difficult one really to get away from, since thought without imagination is very difficult (impossible?), and so thinking about incorporeal things is very difficult. He talks further about how we know things in Art.2 ('whether an angel is composed of matter and form'), which suggests further, I think, the importance of attending to reason even (especially) when imagination cannot follow where the intellect would go.
Sed adhuc ulterius impossibile est quod substantia intellectualis habeat qualemcumque materiam. Operatio enim cuiuslibet rei est secundum modum substantiae eius. Intelligere autem est operatio penitus immaterialis. Quod ex eius obiecto apparet, a quo actus quilibet recipit speciem et rationem, sic enim unumquodque intelligitur, inquantum a materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales formae, quas intellectus non apprehendit secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde relinquitur quod omnis substantia intellectualis est omnino immaterialis. Non est autem necessarium quod ea quae distinguuntur secundum intellectum, sint distincta in rebus, quia intellectus non apprehendit res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum. Unde res materiales, quae sunt infra intellectum nostrum, simpliciori modo sunt in intellectu nostro, quam sint in seipsis. Substantiae autem angelicae sunt supra intellectum nostrum. Unde intellectus noster non potest attingere ad apprehendendum eas secundum quod sunt in seipsis; sed per modum suum, secundum quod apprehendit res compositas. Et sic etiam apprehendit Deum, ut supra dictum est.
The answer to the question raised in Art. 3 ('whether the angels are in any great number') is (I think) not unintuitive - yes, there are lots of them. The first two objections and answers are also fairly straightforward, pointing out that number is not the be confused with quantity or non-simplicity:
[1] Videtur quod Angeli non sint in aliquo magno numero. Numerus enim species quantitatis est, et sequitur divisionem continui. Hoc autem non potest esse in Angelis cum sint incorporei, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo Angeli non possunt esse in aliquo magno numero. ... Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Angelis non est numerus qui est quantitas discreta, causatus ex divisione continui, sed causatus ex distinctione formarum, prout multitudo est de transcendentibus, ut supra dictum est.
[2] Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis propinquum uni, tanto minus est multiplicatum, ut in numeris apparet. Natura autem angelica inter alias naturas creatas est Deo propinquior. Cum ergo Deus sit maxime unus, videtur quod in natura angelica inveniatur minimum de multitudine. ... Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod natura angelica est Deo propinqua, oportet quod habeat minimum de multitudine in sui compositione, non autem ita quod in paucis salvetur.
The full answer also involves reflections on the movements of the heavenly bodies and suchlike, which I suspect is about sorting out how far one should have a [ps]-Dionysian view of being, but those parts are rather beyond me - would anyone care to comment?
Art. 4 ('whether angels differ in species') explains that angels must each be of a different species since
Ea enim quae conveniunt specie et differunt numero, conveniunt in forma, et distinguuntur materialiter. Si ergo Angeli non sunt compositi ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos Angelos unius speciei.
Which reminds that for us (and other material creatures) matter is the thing that individuates. But I don't follow the second half of the 'respondeo dicendum'... what does he mean by talking about matter while assuming the angels are incorporeal - help??! :
Sicut etiam impossibile esset dicere quod essent plures albedines separatae, aut plures humanitates; cum albedines non sint plures nisi secundum quod sunt in pluribus substantiis. Si tamen Angeli haberent materiam, nec sic possent esse plures Angeli unius speciei. Sic enim oporteret quod principium distinctionis unius ab alio esset materia, non quidem secundum divisionem quantitatis, cum sint incorporei, sed secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Quae quidem diversitas materiae causat diversitatem non solum speciei, sed generis.
Finally, in Art. 5 ('whether angels are incorruptible?') Thomas explains that angels are of their nature incorruptible, since their form is not separate from their being (I hope that's not a terribly wrong way of putting it - ?), whereas material things have the possibility of the separation of matter and form, which means the end of its actual being (it ceases to be in act):
Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere Angelos secundum suam naturam esse incorruptibiles. Cuius ratio est, quia nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc, quod forma eius a materia separatur, unde, cum Angelus sit ipsa forma subsistens, ut ex dictis patet, impossibile est quod eius substantia sit corruptibilis. Quod enim convenit alicui secundum se, nunquam ab eo separari potest, ab eo autem cui convenit per aliud, potest separari, separato eo secundum quod ei conveniebat. Rotunditas enim a circulo separari non potest, quia convenit ei secundum seipsum, sed aeneus circulus potest amittere rotunditatem per hoc, quod circularis figura separatur ab aere. Esse autem secundum se competit formae, unumquodque enim est ens actu secundum quod habet formam. Materia vero est ens actu per formam. Compositum igitur ex materia et forma desinit esse actu per hoc, quod forma separatur a materia. Sed si ipsa forma subsistat in suo esse, sicut est in Angelis, ut dictum est, non potest amittere esse. Ipsa igitur immaterialitas Angeli est ratio quare Angelus est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam. Et huius incorruptibilitatis signum accipi potest ex eius intellectuali operatione, quia enim unumquodque operatur secundum quod est actu, operatio rei indicat modum esse ipsius. Species autem et ratio operationis ex obiecto comprehenditur. Obiectum autem intelligibile, cum sit supra tempus, est sempiternum. Unde omnis substantia intellectualis est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam.
He also points out in the first objection and answer that this does not mean angels are not perfectly incorruptible, since their nature is still susceptible to change. Only by grace are the angels perfectly incorruptible. (And so we see again that spiritual creatures are very much not to be confused with their Creator.)
Videtur quod Angeli non sint incorruptibiles. Dicit enim Damascenus de Angelo, quod est substantia intellectualis, gratia et non natura immortalitatem suscipiens. ... Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus accipit immortalitatem perfectam, quae includit omnimodam immutabilitatem, quia omnis mutatio est quaedam mors, ut Augustinus dicit. Perfectam autem immutabilitatem Angeli non nisi per gratiam assequuntur, ut infra patebit.
Right, tell me what howlers I've made...
