Philosophical work of colloquium: preparation

Preparation for each of us:

1) Provide ourselves with a copy of the text - I suggest we use the old Blackfriars English text. Are there any major textual issues, or can we just each use whatever Latin text we have available?

2) Prepare questions that we have - some of mine are in the post below. Do put them in the combox as you think of them, then we can all bear them in mind when doing part 3). I will draw up a final list before the meeting starts.


3) We prepare the articles listed against our name below (that is, are prepared to present an outline of the argument in each one, plus anything else that we think ought to be said about it) - we may not get through them all, of course.

We also go through "our" articles in an edition that gives cross-references to other works, and check if there is something in those references that would be useful to have to hand - if so, either - send me the precise reference to the texts you think would be useful, or
- bring them with you in handout form (English and Latin).

[the B.A.C. edition, for example, lists cross-references at the head of each article.]

Opera omnia Latine here. Opera lots anglice here.

Alan: 50.1, 51.2, 53.2, 54.5, 56.3
Fr Andrew: 50.5, 51.3, 53.3, 55.1, 57.1
Fr Marcus: 50.3, 52.1, 54.1, 55.2, 57.2
br Paul: 50.4, 52.2, 54.2, 55.3, 57.3
fr Thomas: 50.2, 52.3, 54.3, 56.1, 57.4
Weronika: 51.1, 53.1, 54.4, 56.2, 57.5

If you have any strong feelings about doing or not doing a particular article, please swap amongst yourselves (to minimise possibility for organisational chaos).

Programme for colloquium

We should have a list of concrete discussion topics. The other option is to treat this as a reading break - we choose a list of articles and read through them together.

Here are my suggestions - they are only ideas, and I can't put them more precisely.

• in what way is an angel composite?
• what is a substance?
  
• the difference between esse and quod est, and how composition of esse and quod est differs from that of form and matter (there is a chapter on this in the SG).
  
• why angels have to be of different species (why matter is the principle of individuation)
• something about the knowledge of the angels - personally I would choose "how the angels know singulars" :-)

I think we can count on one meeting on the first day, three on the second and one on the last - what do you chaps think?

This post is written with Fr Andrew in mind particularly, but not, of course, exclusively.

In his short work, De Operationibus Occultis Naturae, St Thomas is discussing why bodily things, whether animate or inanimate, have the properties they do. He says there is a distinction between properties that can be explained simply by the properties of the elements of which the things are composed, and other properties which can't be so explained. As examples of the first kind he gives a stone moving downwards 'because the element of earth predominates in it', and metals cooling things 'because of the property of water'; metals supposedly containing water. As examples of the other kind of property he gives magnets attracting iron and medicines 'purging certain humours from certain parts of the body'.
These latter properties, he says, can't be explained by appealing to the elements of which the things are made, since neither earth, air, fire nor water attract iron or purge unpleasant humours. From which he concludes, 'therefore it is necessary to reduce these actions into higher prinicples', i.e. postulate causes higher than the elements, to explain them. The higher principles, he says, must themselves be bodily, since 'what makes must be similar to what is made', and as the immediate cause of the cycle of generation and corruption, they must not be something completely immobile: these higher principles, of course, are the corpora caelestia (this is not to exclude the yet higher causality of the angels, nor, evidently, the immediate activity of the first Cause in all change.) So he argues that it is under the influence of these superior, incorruptible bodies at the moment of generation, that the generated substance has properties that exceed the virtue of the elements within it.
What I should like to ask is whether the original distinction can be accepted: that is, the distinction between properties that can be explained simply in virtue of a thing's elementary parts and others which can't But this also raises the question of what the modern equivalent of the 4 elements is: presumably not the elements of the Periodic Table, if these have kinds of particle in common.

Malum meum

I messed up the organisation. I apologise. Proper posts to follow.

Sanctifying Grace, Baptism and Deification

My query for your consideration regards the doctrine of grace.

Given that sanctifying grace, as taught by the Angelic Doctor (i.e. ST, Ia IIae, Q. 110, 111, 114; ST, IIIa, Q. 72), can be bestowed upon an individual prior to baptism, and that this grace is the grace of deification (divine sonship), and furthermore given that this grace may be lost by subsequent mortal sin, does this imply that the state of divine sonship is a transitory state which in and of itself imparts no permanent character on the soul? If this is the case then do we have a problem regarding multiple moments of regeneration, re-birth and justification?

Is there a way out? Three possibilities present themselves to me:

1. Sanctifying grace once received does indeed change the soul forever, so much so that even when it is lost through mortal sin the recipient remains a child of God (although a prodigal one)

2. Sanctifying grace is only bestowed prior to baptism upon those souls whom God in his omniscience knows will not receive the ordinary bath of deification in baptism

3. Sanctifying grace is only bestowed prior to baptism upon those souls whom God in his omniscience knows will reach the permanent seal of baptism without the guilt of mortal sin

A further question presents itself: If sanctifying grace can be gained prior to baptism (and as we know this would be a grace that justifies us) then in what way can the indelible seal imparted at baptism be salvific (rather than an optional extra endowment)? This was the conundrum that Feeney could not answer in the 1950s (he arrived to the absurd position of accepting that deified children of God possessing sanctifying grace and loving God with perfect supernatural charity could still be damned for lacking the seal of water baptism). Can we do better than this?

The Beatitudes and Fruits of Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange

Dear Friends

I have some questions about the work of Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange rather than St. Thomas himself. I hope that this is an acceptable topic for discussion.

In the course of my research I have become increasingly convinced that the virtues, Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits form an organic whole in the ST 2a2ae. The patterns and interconnections are complex, fascinating and often somewhat counter-intuitive. To take one small example, courage as an infused virtue is linked to courage as a Gift. Courage as a Gift is linked to the Beatitudes of meekness and ‘hungering and thirsting for righteousness’. The beatitude of meekness in turn leads to the Fruits of patience and long-suffering. I am beginning. I believe, to understand some of underlying principles of these interconnections. This study will form the basis of my doctoral dissertation.

When I read Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, however, I do not see any awareness of the existence of these patterns in his summaries of Aquinas's work. He does, of course, claim that the infused and acquired virtues are different, because that is what Aquinas says. But even here, however, his definitions do not in practice establish grounds for supporting the assertion of a distinction. In his "Reality - A Synthesis Of Thomistic Thought", for example, Garrigou-Lagrange writes that “Justice, either acquired or infused, is a virtue residing in man's will, a virtue which destroys selfishness, and enables him to give to each neighbor that neighbor's due.” [51.2] The phrase ‘either acquired or infused’ in this definition conflates the acquired and infused modes of justice and fails to establish any obvious principle of distinction. Nevertheless, such a principle of distinction must exist given that the former without the latter leads to hell, not heaven.

Garrigou-Lagrange adopts the same approach for the remaining cardinal virtues. For the acquired and infused modes of each virtue, he proposes the same, essentially Aristotelian definition. The only principle of distinction he suggests is one of degree rather than kind, and the scale by which such distinctions of degree are established is left undefined. In practice, therefore, Garrigou-Lagrange validates an essentially two-tier approach. The philosophical virtues continue to be treated in an Aristotelian manner, while the theological additions are treated separately.

Furthemore, by the theological additions, Garrigou-Lagrange refers almost exclusively to the Gifts (following the pattern, perhaps, of John of St. Thomas); he does not mention the Beatitudes or the Fruits. So Garrigou-Lagrange seems to treat the acquried and infused versions of the cardinal virtues as essentially the same, although different in terms of their source. The Gifts give some sort of boost to these virtues. The Beatitudes and Fruits do not seem to feature.

My reading of Garrigou-Lagrange is still somewhat limited, so my questions are:

(1) Does G-L have a theory of the Thomistic virtues which includes Beatitudes and Fruits?
(2) Does G-L distinguish acquired and infused virtues in any way except source and degree?
(3) What, actually, does G-L think that the Gifts give to the virtues?

I would find this helpful for my dissertation, as well as for understanding the history of the interpretation of St. Thomas in the twentieth century.

Yours in the Lord

Fr. Andrew Pinsent

Knowledge, Human, of Singulars

I am wondering what it means to say I know, for example, Jim the ferret.

If I have never seen a ferret before, and I smell and set eyes on Jim, in this first seeing I know not just “this”, but also “ferret” - though I may not yet have a clear concept of ferret. I smell and see Jim. I know that the smell and the shape belong together. Moreover, I can tell that there are perhaps two smells, and one is Jim, the other not. When I see another ferret, I think “oh look, another one of those things”.

I do not see a lake of various colours, and analyse them into shapes, and then from analyses of many similar shapes identify members of a set I choose to call “ferret”, and by observing the temporal co-incidence of certain shapes and a certain pattern of smell-sensation, conclude that the two go together. And then decide that another pattern of shifting colour is so similar to the first, that I will class it as “ferret” as well.

Since in this philosophy knowledge is caused by the thing known, the action of the object on the knower, and is a union of the known and the knower, the knower in some way becoming the thing known, we can immediately see that the unity of Jim-as-known-by-us must be in Jim. What remains to be explored is how the unity of Jim is found, in a certain sense, in me, although Jim-in-me arrives only by a kind of refraction through the senses.

The proper objects of the senses are a certain class of accident, a kind of being. What makes an accident an accident is that it has its being from another. Where substantial form gives being to that which it informs, whereas accidental receives being from that which it informs. So the being, the esse by which the sensible accidental form exists and informs, actualises the knower, is in fact the esse of the subject.

This actualisation of the knower is physical, sensible, particular. Jim is actually sensed, but not understood; being a material being, he is actually sensible, but only potentially intelligible. Likewise, my particular physical knowledge of Jim is only potentially intellectual knowledge.

We know that we come to intellectual knowledge of natures, to knowledge of universals, through abstraction from the phantasm, which in this case is (I think one can say this, though of course I am now wondering) Jim-in-me, the action of Jim on me (present or recalled). It is not the phantasm itself that we know – the word names an action or result of an action by Jim in me, a presence of Jim in me, and it is Jim I know. Jim is able to inform me, act on me, physically, but his material being cannot of itself have any contact, touch in any way, my intellect.

St Thomas teaches that we have one soul. With different parts and powers, but one. Material beings can inform the lower part of the soul – and the soul itself enables them to form the intellect, lending as it were its immateriality to something that has it only in potentiality. [I think that maybe an interpretation I read in Fr M.A. Krąpiec, OP's Realizm Ludzkiego Poznania – the realism of human knowing, and not my own, but I agree with it, tentatively.] And so through abstraction we arrive at knowledge of universal natures and so on.

However, is there not some intellectual knowledge of the singular? It seems there may be. I do not mean a knowledge independent of the phantasms, but one which while reliant on them is truly a knowledge of the singular. It must be a knowledge of Jim under some immaterial aspect. Jim of himself has no actual intelligibility - it is actualised by the intellect. So I wonder if the universal nature of ferret might be, as it were, lent particularity by the individual soul. Or if the fact that the universal nature is known by an individual soul does not involve or imply some kind of particularity. ST I.89.4 says that in the infused knowledge of species, the separated soul knows the individuals "to which it has some kind of determinate relation", to which it is "determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order", because "everything received is received according to the mode of the receiver".

And that is where the essay will go when it is written, but this post is already so overdue that I will put it up as it stands. Which may suggest that this post is the casual work of a half-hour or so - it's not! I hope that its many gaps and loose phrasing will provide fuel for many comments :-)

other blog?

see quaestiones quod.,

Shall we run two, or just put everything on the one? It might be livelier the second way! (fr Thomas, I will get back to the context in a bit)

Political and Royal Government

I have chosen Ia, 81, 3. The title of the article is “Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?” I have chosen it not for its own sake but because of a comparison St Thomas makes in replying to the second objection. St Thomas’s general point is that, though they have some power of resistance to the reason the irascible and concupiscible appetites do obey reason. They respond to the rational apprehensions of the soul and they can be overruled by the will. Nevertheless, there is room for recalcitrance on the part of these appetites room for "another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." This is in contrast to the limbs etc. which, unless there is some defect, obey the will immediately.

St Thomas uses a political comparison to illustrate this point.

"As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): 'We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power.' For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey."

We might suppose that a "a politic and royal" government is inferior to a "despotic" one especially as the conflicting laws in our members and our minds are obviously a misfortune and the resurrected body will possess the quality of subtlety by which the body will be altogether subject to the soul.

But St Thomas does not propose despotic government as the model of human governance. In IaIIae, 105, 1 he proposes a mixture of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy as the best form of government. "[T]he best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all."

As such St Thomas’s preference is for monarchy because the business of government involves the ordering of many things to a single end so it is best done by that which is by nature one. In De Regno St Thomas presents the mixture of aristocracy and democracy with monarchy as a matter of ‘tempering’ monarchy and of each element preventing the corruption of the other. In the Summa he says "this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring".

It is worth bearing in mind that the disorder of the irascible and concupiscible appetites is a result of the disorder of the intellect. For it is because the intellect is not subject to God that the body is not fully subject to the mind. It is because man is bodily that a single mortal sin does not suffice to damn him for all eternity. So the perishable body may weigh down the soul and defy the intellect but it also anchors the soul in this world and prevents its sins from dragging it immediately into the second death. Thus the tempering of the different elements of the state by each other resembles the saving (or at least damnation-postponing) tension between the sensible appetites and the powers of the soul.

Would it be taking things to far to equate the aristocratic element with the intellect and the monarchical with the will?

In Unam Sanctam Boniface VIII explains the distinction of the Church from the State and subordination of the latter to the former with reference to the axiom of Dionysius the Areopagite “it is a law of the divinity that the lowest things reach the highest place by intermediaries”. The Catechism of the Catholic Church §1884 makes a similar point,

"God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power. He entrusts to every creature the functions it is capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own nature. This mode of governance ought to be followed in social life. The way God acts in governing the world, which bears witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire the wisdom of those who govern human communities. They should behave as ministers of divine providence."

Even in beatitude the rule of the soul over the body is not despotic because the rule of God over the soul not despotic. Man possesses free will in heaven because his incapacity to sin results from the perfect apprehension of the uncreated good not from the coercion of the will.

It seems therefore that the form of government St Thomas proposes, though it is a safeguard against the corruption of government, is also the form of government most fitting to human nature as such.

In ST IaIIae, 95, 4 while defending Isidore’s division of the law St Thomas says of a 'lex' that is in Roman Law a legislative proposal sanctioned by the Senate and the Assembly of the Roman People that it is the best form of legislation. "Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these [other forms], and which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the 'Lords and Commons'".

"Est autem aliquod regimen ex istis com mixtum quod est optimum : et secundum hoc sumitur lex, 'quam majores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt.'"

St Thomas makes no mention of plebiscites in his discussion of government in IaIIae, 105, 1. Given the bicameral character of the Dominican Chapter composed of Priors and Definitors both elected by the ordinary members of the order but the former ruling and the latter elected only to represent the subject with powers lasting only for the length of the representative assembly of which he is a member.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the plebeian assent of which St Thomas speaks would take this representative form. This is the same form given to it by Simon de Montfort in 1265 when the elected representatives of the commons met for the first time. De Montfort knew St Dominic as a child and the immediately preceding Parliament, 'The First English Parliament' of 1258, was also held under de Montfort’s auspices and met in Blackfriars Oxford.

This concept of the 'Political and Royal Government' was central to the thought of the fifteenth century theorist of the English Constitution Sir John Fortescue who argued that the English constitution accurately reflects the teachings of St Thomas Aquinas and severely criticised the despotic tendencies of the French Monarchy and the civilian tradition in general.

St Thomas’s comments in the Summa and De Regno as well as the works of Fortescue suggest that, in fact, the English tradition also reflects the Roman tradition of the Monarchical Republic better than the Byzantine forms of Roman Law adopted on the continent.

Divine Simplicity and Human Knowledge

My quotation is from the Summa contra Gentes, Book III, chapter 118. The title of this chapter is ‘That by the divine law, men are obliged to have the correct faith’. I want to look at just one argument made in the chapter (by the way, the chapter presupposes that we are obliged to love God, which is discussed in c. 116). The Latin text is as follows:-

Quicumque errat circa aliquid quod est de essentia rei, non cognoscit illam rem: sicut si aliquis apprehenderet animal irrationale aestimans hoc esse hominem, non cognosceret hominem. Secus autem esset si erraret circa aliquod accidentium eius. Sed in compositis, qui errat circa aliquod principiorum essentialium, etsi non cognoscat rem simpliciter, tamen cognoscit eam secundum quid: sicut qui existimat hominem esse animal irrationale, cognoscit eum secundum genus suum.

In simplicibus autem hoc non potest accidere, sed quilibet error totaliter excludit cognitionem rei. Deus autem est maxime simplex. Ergo quicumque errat circa Deum, non cognoscit Deum: sicut qui credit Deum esse corpus, nullo modo cognoscit Deum, sed apprehendit aliquid aliud loco Dei. Secundum autem quod aliquid cognoscitur, secundum hoc amatur et desideratur. Qui ergo errat circa Deum, nec amare potest Deum, nec desiderare ipsum ut finem. Cum igitur lex divina ad hoc tendat ut homines ament et desiderent Deum, oportet quod ex lege divina homines obligentur ad rectam fidem habendam de Deo…

…Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium quod nihil refert ad salutem hominis cum quacumque fide serviat Deo.

Here is my translation:-

Whoever makes a mistake about something which is essential to a thing, does not know that thing. For example, if someone saw an irrational animal and thought ‘this is man’, he would not know what man is. It would be different if he made a mistake about something accidental to it. Now, when it is a question of a complex thing, someone who makes a mistake about one of its essential principles does not know that thing simply speaking; yet he knows it in a certain respect. For example, if someone thinks that man is an irrational animal, he knows man’s genus.

But this cannot happen with knowledge of simple things; for here, any kind of mistake completely prevents knowledge of the thing. Now, God is supremely simple. Therefore, whoever makes a mistake about God, does not know God. For example, if someone thinks that God is a body, he does not know God at all, but he has in mind something else, in place of God. But it is insofar as something is known that it is loved and desired. Therefore, whoever makes a mistake about God cannot love God, nor desire him as an end. Since, then, the divine law aims that men should love and desire God, the divine law must bind men to have a correct faith concerning God…

…In this way is excluded the error of some who said that it does not matter for man’s salvation in what faith he serves God.

We can note St Thomas’s realism. Knowing a thing means there is a real contact between the mind of the knower and the thing known. It is not just a matter of being able to make correct statements, e.g. ‘God created the universe’ or ‘God is great’.

If a thing belongs to a certain group within a wider category – in the technical phrase, if it is put into a certain species by genus and differentia -, we can at least know what general category it belongs to, even if we are wrong about the species. That is not a very thorough knowledge, but at least our mind is in some sense in contact with the thing. But if the essence is something utterly simple, we either ‘hit it’, mentally, or we miss it. If you are shooting at a target, you can get more or less close to the centre. But if we are shooting at a mathematical point, we can only hit or miss.

For example, if you tell me to think of white and I think of two, or to think of length and I think of thought, then I am not even partly right or right secundum quid. That is analogous to the difference between thinking of God and thinking of ‘a bodily creator of the universe’ or ‘an entirely necessary, but mutable being’, or anything else which combines divine attributes with errors. One would not then be thinking about God, while being wrong about him in some respect; one would be thinking about something else; a purely mythical being. For every divine attribute is God; so if I deny a divine attribute, I deny God.

This of course raises an interesting question about the other religions (ut aiunt), particularly perhaps Islam. For Islam is not simply unaware of the Trinity, or of the divine love – lack of explicit awareness of a divine attribute is compatible with knowing God – it denies these of set purpose. It puts before its adherents ‘a creator who is not love’ and ‘a creator whose nature is not such that it can be possessed by more than one Person’. As such, it is not that its doctrine of God is deficient, or partly true and partly false; it puts a purely mythical being before its adherents.

This is not to say that no Muslim can ever think of God, only that he cannot think of him qua Muslim. It may be that he has 2 concepts, both of which he signifies by the same term, ‘God’, one which enables him to know God in some respect, the other which refers to a purely mythical being.

Angeli tui sancti, habitantes in ea, nos in pace custodiant

This post is not an augur of things to come, for I am no philosopher or theologian. It may, however, serve to reduce the fear of asking stupid questions in public.

In St Thomas's Summa Theologiae, he treats of angels particularly in the Prima Pars qq.50-64. In I.50 he writes 'on the substance of angels considered absolutely', under the articles

1. Is there any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?
2. Supposing that an angel is such, is it composed of matter and form?
3. How many are there?
4. Their difference from each other
5. Their immortality or incorruptibility

(The links are to the English Dominican translation online at New Advent. Q.50 in Latin is at the top of this page at the Corpus Thomisticum website.)

This may or may not be relevant to any other reader, but as a non-philosopher non-theologian rustica illiterata medieval historian, I find that the angels have provided a good way in to certain distinctions which must be kept clear. Thomism may be the philosophy of common sense, but, as is now often remarked, common sense has become very uncommon, and it is difficult not to be infected by materialist assumption. To be confronted by the fact of the angels is to be confronted by the utter inadequacy of a vaguely materialist approach to being and knowing.

328 The existence of the spiritual, non-corporeal beings that Sacred Scripture usually calls "angels" is a truth of faith. the witness of Scripture is as clear as the unanimity of Tradition.
330 As purely spiritual creatures angels have intelligence and will: they are personal and immortal creatures, surpassing in perfection all visible creatures, as the splendour of their glory bears witness.
CCC

In I.50.1 Thomas argues for - well, a question, O wise comrades: I think he is arguing in the first instance for the possibility of the existence of 'wholly incorporeal' creatures, not (as such) for their actual existence - but essentially making a strong argument from fittingness for their actual existence - is that right?

Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere aliquas creaturas incorporeas. Id enim quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit est bonum quod consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Perfecta autem assimilatio effectus ad causam attenditur, quando effectus imitatur causam secundum illud per quod causa producit effectum; sicut calidum facit calidum. Deus autem creaturam producit per intellectum et voluntatem, ut supra ostensum est. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod sint aliquae creaturae intellectuales. Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicuius virtutis corporeae, quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc. Unde necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura.

(Incidentally this line of thought also makes clear that spirit is as such superior to matter, while also showing that spiritual creatures are still creatures and therefore infinitely inferior to their Maker. That is one of the distinctions angels help one to think about.)

Next in the same 'respondeo dicendum' Thomas refers to the implications of distinguishing between sense, imagination and intellect.

Antiqui autem, ignorantes vim intelligendi, et non distinguentes inter sensum et intellectum, nihil esse existimaverunt in mundo, nisi quod sensu et imaginatione apprehendi potest. Et quia sub imaginatione non cadit nisi corpus, existimaverunt quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus; ut philosophus dicit in IV Physic. Et ex his processit Sadducaeorum error, dicentium non esse spiritum. Sed hoc ipsum quod intellectus est altior sensu, rationabiliter ostendit esse aliquas res incorporeas, a solo intellectu comprehensibiles.

This is equally a modern error. In the current climate it is a particularly difficult one really to get away from, since thought without imagination is very difficult (impossible?), and so thinking about incorporeal things is very difficult. He talks further about how we know things in Art.2 ('whether an angel is composed of matter and form'), which suggests further, I think, the importance of attending to reason even (especially) when imagination cannot follow where the intellect would go.

Sed adhuc ulterius impossibile est quod substantia intellectualis habeat qualemcumque materiam. Operatio enim cuiuslibet rei est secundum modum substantiae eius. Intelligere autem est operatio penitus immaterialis. Quod ex eius obiecto apparet, a quo actus quilibet recipit speciem et rationem, sic enim unumquodque intelligitur, inquantum a materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales formae, quas intellectus non apprehendit secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde relinquitur quod omnis substantia intellectualis est omnino immaterialis. Non est autem necessarium quod ea quae distinguuntur secundum intellectum, sint distincta in rebus, quia intellectus non apprehendit res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum. Unde res materiales, quae sunt infra intellectum nostrum, simpliciori modo sunt in intellectu nostro, quam sint in seipsis. Substantiae autem angelicae sunt supra intellectum nostrum. Unde intellectus noster non potest attingere ad apprehendendum eas secundum quod sunt in seipsis; sed per modum suum, secundum quod apprehendit res compositas. Et sic etiam apprehendit Deum, ut supra dictum est.

The answer to the question raised in Art. 3 ('whether the angels are in any great number') is (I think) not unintuitive - yes, there are lots of them. The first two objections and answers are also fairly straightforward, pointing out that number is not the be confused with quantity or non-simplicity:

[1] Videtur quod Angeli non sint in aliquo magno numero. Numerus enim species quantitatis est, et sequitur divisionem continui. Hoc autem non potest esse in Angelis cum sint incorporei, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo Angeli non possunt esse in aliquo magno numero. ... Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Angelis non est numerus qui est quantitas discreta, causatus ex divisione continui, sed causatus ex distinctione formarum, prout multitudo est de transcendentibus, ut supra dictum est.
[2] Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis propinquum uni, tanto minus est multiplicatum, ut in numeris apparet. Natura autem angelica inter alias naturas creatas est Deo propinquior. Cum ergo Deus sit maxime unus, videtur quod in natura angelica inveniatur minimum de multitudine. ... Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod natura angelica est Deo propinqua, oportet quod habeat minimum de multitudine in sui compositione, non autem ita quod in paucis salvetur.

The full answer also involves reflections on the movements of the heavenly bodies and suchlike, which I suspect is about sorting out how far one should have a [ps]-Dionysian view of being, but those parts are rather beyond me - would anyone care to comment?

Art. 4 ('whether angels differ in species') explains that angels must each be of a different species since

Ea enim quae conveniunt specie et differunt numero, conveniunt in forma, et distinguuntur materialiter. Si ergo Angeli non sunt compositi ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos Angelos unius speciei.

Which reminds that for us (and other material creatures) matter is the thing that individuates. But I don't follow the second half of the 'respondeo dicendum'... what does he mean by talking about matter while assuming the angels are incorporeal - help??! :

Sicut etiam impossibile esset dicere quod essent plures albedines separatae, aut plures humanitates; cum albedines non sint plures nisi secundum quod sunt in pluribus substantiis. Si tamen Angeli haberent materiam, nec sic possent esse plures Angeli unius speciei. Sic enim oporteret quod principium distinctionis unius ab alio esset materia, non quidem secundum divisionem quantitatis, cum sint incorporei, sed secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Quae quidem diversitas materiae causat diversitatem non solum speciei, sed generis.

Finally, in Art. 5 ('whether angels are incorruptible?') Thomas explains that angels are of their nature incorruptible, since their form is not separate from their being (I hope that's not a terribly wrong way of putting it - ?), whereas material things have the possibility of the separation of matter and form, which means the end of its actual being (it ceases to be in act):

Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere Angelos secundum suam naturam esse incorruptibiles. Cuius ratio est, quia nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc, quod forma eius a materia separatur, unde, cum Angelus sit ipsa forma subsistens, ut ex dictis patet, impossibile est quod eius substantia sit corruptibilis. Quod enim convenit alicui secundum se, nunquam ab eo separari potest, ab eo autem cui convenit per aliud, potest separari, separato eo secundum quod ei conveniebat. Rotunditas enim a circulo separari non potest, quia convenit ei secundum seipsum, sed aeneus circulus potest amittere rotunditatem per hoc, quod circularis figura separatur ab aere. Esse autem secundum se competit formae, unumquodque enim est ens actu secundum quod habet formam. Materia vero est ens actu per formam. Compositum igitur ex materia et forma desinit esse actu per hoc, quod forma separatur a materia. Sed si ipsa forma subsistat in suo esse, sicut est in Angelis, ut dictum est, non potest amittere esse. Ipsa igitur immaterialitas Angeli est ratio quare Angelus est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam. Et huius incorruptibilitatis signum accipi potest ex eius intellectuali operatione, quia enim unumquodque operatur secundum quod est actu, operatio rei indicat modum esse ipsius. Species autem et ratio operationis ex obiecto comprehenditur. Obiectum autem intelligibile, cum sit supra tempus, est sempiternum. Unde omnis substantia intellectualis est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam.

He also points out in the first objection and answer that this does not mean angels are not perfectly incorruptible, since their nature is still susceptible to change. Only by grace are the angels perfectly incorruptible. (And so we see again that spiritual creatures are very much not to be confused with their Creator.)

Videtur quod Angeli non sint incorruptibiles. Dicit enim Damascenus de Angelo, quod est substantia intellectualis, gratia et non natura immortalitatem suscipiens. ... Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus accipit immortalitatem perfectam, quae includit omnimodam immutabilitatem, quia omnis mutatio est quaedam mors, ut Augustinus dicit. Perfectam autem immutabilitatem Angeli non nisi per gratiam assequuntur, ut infra patebit.

Right, tell me what howlers I've made...